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RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0010  
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0020  
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0021  
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9089  
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7275  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000188

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND EUR/SCE

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [AORC](#) [NATO](#) [RS](#) [AL](#) [BK](#) [KV](#) [MK](#) [BR](#)

SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION, THE BALKANS  
AND CAUCASUS

REF: SECSTATE 11928

Classified By: political Counselor Stephen Liston. Reason 1.5 (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY. Brazil's position on Kosovo recognition has not changed: the GOB would prefer a clear UN consensus in favor of Kosovo independence. Serbia is lobbying Brazil and other key UN members to file briefs at the ICJ in its favor. The Foreign Ministers of Macedonia and Bosnia have recently visited Brazil to seek investment in their countries and improved bilateral contacts. Brazil will enhance its own presence in the Balkans with the opening later this year of an embassy in Tirana. Brazil remains curious about the situation in the southern Caucasus, prospects for renewed violence and Russia's relations with its neighbors and NATO.  
END SUMMARY.

12. (C) In an extensive discussion with Ministry for External Relations (MRE) Director for Eastern Europe Elizabeth Mazzella, Embassy Brasilia found that there is no change in Brazil's position on recognition of Kosovo. Brazil prefers consensus on UN issues and would like to believe that there can be some arrangement possible whereby Serbia can accept Kosovo independence, possibly as a condition for EU membership or in exchange for territory north of the Ibar. Even though the MRE understands that according to the Serbian government these scenarios are highly unlikely, Brazil will continue to prefer not to take a potentially controversial position. Mazzella mentioned that Brazil has been lobbied "skillfully" by Serbian MFA Undersecretary Zoran Vujic to file a brief with the ICJ on Serbia's contention that Kosovo's declaration of independence is illegal. Given longstanding Brazilian concerns about the importance of what it considers international law in defense of national sovereignty, the MRE is considering Serbia's request. Comment: That Serbia's request would receive consideration has little to do with the situation in the Balkans and much to do with long-standing Brazilian paranoia that outside forces could potentially act to take away Brazil's Amazon region. While such concerns are not based in any real threat, they have a high enough profile in Brazilian political discourse that they must be given consideration. End comment.

13. (C) Mazzella also reported Serbian fear-mongering about the U.S. and Czech governments "arming" Albanian "criminals" in the guise of the newly-created Kosovo Security Force (KSF). Embassy polmiloff pointed out that the KSF would be

smaller and less well armed than the Rio Police Department, would be under NATO supervision and would be heavily outgunned by Serb forces on Kosovo's borders. Mazzella asked if the EU would be playing a larger role in Kosovo rule of law and expressed concern that EULEX was insufficient, citing Serbian claims that independent Kosovo would become a haven for crime.

Polmiloff noted that without an improved economy, crime would be difficult to control and the greatest barrier to economic improvement was the lack of standing with the UN and IFIs that discouraged foreign assistance and investment.

14. (C) The first part of 2009 has seen an expansion of Brazilian attention to the Southeast Europe region with the January visits by the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia and Macedonia to Brasilia. Apart from the understandable objective of escaping a winter in the Balkans for Brazil's more congenial climate, both Ministers had similar goals: to improve bilateral ties and to seek investments in their countries by portraying them as potential "hubs" for commercial activity in the region. When asked what sorts of investments might be possible in Macedonia, Mazzella, replied that Brazil has nothing specific in mind but was looking for one or two "symbolic" opportunities to demonstrate Brazil's global reach by establishing a presence in the Balkans. Both Macedonia and Bosnia signed agreements on visa free travel with Brazil and stated intentions to open regional embassies in Brasilia to cover all or most of South America. The Brazilian government continues to expand its own diplomatic presence abroad and will later this year open its first embassy in Tirana.

BRASILIA 00000188 002 OF 002

15. (C) Moving to the east, the Mazzella expressed concern about the situation in Georgia. The MRE had expected that President Sakashvili would be forced from office for "causing" last year's conflict with Russia. (NOTE: Without diplomatic presence in Georgia, Brazil's information on the South Caucasus comes only from Moscow.) Brazil is encouraged by what is seen as more moderate rhetoric from Moscow regarding the U.S. and NATO, noting that with the fall in world oil process, Moscow now seems less confrontational. Mazzella asked if the new U.S. Administration might signal a change in U.S. missile defense plans. While understanding that the U.S. has sought dialogue with Russia to provide assurance that anti-missile defenses will have no effect on Russian deterrence, Brazil believes that missile defense will remain an irritant to the NATO-Russia relationship.  
SOBEL